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900 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY-WHEN POLICE
POWER REGULATIONS CONSTITUTE A TAKING REQUIRING JUST COMPEN-
SATION
In 1972 the State of Maryland enacted legislation prohibiting
surface mining on land owned by the State.1 Shortly thereafter,
the Bureau of Mines of Maryland directed Buffalo Coal Company
to terminate strip mining operations that were being conducted in
the Savage River State Forest. Buffalo and its lessor, George's
Creek Coal and Land Company, sought declaratory relief, contend-
ing the legislation did not require that all strip mining operations
cease, but in the alternative if it did a taking of property would
occur for which just compensation would have to be paid.2 The
trial court concluded that possessors of strip mining permits could
continue operations permitted by existing permits.2 Further, they
concluded that the legislature under the police power had the author-
ity to restrict strip mining,4 but that as to holders of mineral
1. M . ANN. CODE, Natural Resources § 7-705 (1974), amending MD. ANN. CODE art.
66c § 662(a) (1973). Natural Resources § 7-505(b) reads as follows:
(b) Bureau prohibited to issue, extend or renew permit for state owned land.
The bureau may not issue, extend or renew any permit to mine coal by the
open-pit or strip method on any land the state owns whether or not the
ownership includes mineral rights incident to the land. If the Bureau's failure
to issue, extend or renew a permit involves taking a property right withoutjust compensation In violation of the Constitution of the United States or the
Constitution of Maryland and the General Assembly has not appropriated suf-
ficient funds to pay the compensation, the state may use available funds
under Program Open Space to purchase or otherwise pay for the property
rights.
2. Bureau of Mines v. George's Creek Coal & Land Co., 272 Md. 143, -, 321 A.2d
748, 751 (1974). In 1931, George's Creek Coal Co. conveyed 8,621 acres to T. 1-. andF. B. McMillen, reserving to George's Creek all the mineral rights. In 1937, the McMillens
conveyed 5,685 acres (the McMillen tract) to the United States, subject to the mineral
rights exception and reservation in favor of George's Creek. In 1954, the United States
conveyed the MeMillen tract to the state of Maryland, subject to the exception and reser-
vation of mineral rights. That property is now the Savage River State Forest. Id. at -,
321 A.2d at 750.
In Department of Forests and Parks v. George's Creek Coal & Land Co., 250 Md125, 242 A.2d 165 (1968), the Maryland Court of Appeals held that the State of Maryland
acquired the McMillen tract subject to the terms and provisions of the 1931 deed, and
thus the reservation of mineral rights included the right to remove the coal by strip min-Ing. In 1969, George's Creek leased its coal rights reserved in the 1931 deed to BuffaloCoal Company. Bureau of Mines v. George's Creek Coal & Land Co., 272 Md. 148, 321 A.2d
748, 749 (1974).
3. In order to mine coal by the open-pit or strip method, Article 66C, § 661(a) re-
quired that Buffalo obtain a permit from the Bureau of Mines. A permit was subsequently
issued to Buffalo, which included the McMillen tract. This permit was the only existingpermit at the time MD. ANN. CODE Natural Resources, § 7-SOS(b) (1974), became ef-
fective.
4. For a statement of the tiaditional concept of state police power, see A. RUSSELL,
THE POLICE POWER OF THE STATE 85-100 (1900),
Whatever differences of opinion may exist as to the extent and boundaries
of the police power, and however difficult it may be to render a satisfactory
definition of it, there seems to be no doubt that it does extend to the protec-
tion of the lives, health, and property of the citizens, and to the preservation
of good order and the public morals.
Id. at 100, quoting Beer Co. v. Mass., 97 U.S. 25, 33 (1877).
Under the police power, the use of land has long been regulated for the advance.
ment of some acknowledged public interest. It has been customarily established that thi.
"advancement" consists of preventing an activity which is injurious to health, safety, or
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tights which could be realized only by strip mining, prohibition re-
sulted in a taking requiring just compensation." The taking was
found to be total. The Court of Appeals remanded the case for
further proceedings to determine if the taking was of such magni-
tude as to constitute a taking of property for which just compen-
sation had to be paid.s The matter was settled without return-
ing to court, and the State paid the plaintiffs $400,000. Bureau of
Mines of Maryland v. George's Creek Coal & Land, Co., 272 MD.
143, 321 A.2d 748 (Ct. App. 1974).
The significance of this case revolves around the determination
of what constitutes a taking within the context of the police power.
This must be distinguished from the power of eminent domain7
under which property may not be taken for public use without just
morals of the community, and in a more obscure standard, the general welfare. S. WEAVER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION § 829 (1946).
The court In the instant case stated :
That strip mining leads to the "scarification and uglification" of the land is a
matter of which we took cognizance in Department of Forests and Parks v.
George's Creek Coal & Land Co. (250 Md. 125, 242 A.2d 165 (1968)...
a widely known and well-understood method of recovering coal in Maryland
at least since 1918. Equally well understood Is the fact that strip mining
destroys the surface of the land, causes soil erosion, stream pollution, de-
struction of wildlife and vegetation.
Bureau of Mines v. George's Creek Coal & Land Co., 272 Md. 143, -, 321 A.2d 748, 752
n.1 (1974).
We think the statutory prohibition of the open-pit or strip method of mining
coal constitutes reasonable regulation under the State's police power calcu-
lated to protect the environment and to preserve State owned land for public
use for present and future generations of citizens.
Id. at -, 321 A.2d at 765.
5, The opinion of the trial court was based on evidence showing that the only feasible
way to exercise coal rights was by strip mining, and that deep mine rights had no valueif the right to strip mine did not exist. Finally, evidence showed that there were no
other minerals of value beneath the surface, but if there were, strip mining would first
have to take place before their value could be realized. In other words, the court con-
sidered the taking total, requiring just compensation. George's Creek Coal & Land Co. v.
Buckley, No. 6349 Equity (C. Md., filed Nov. 28, 1973).
. 6. The case was remanded for the purpose of additional evidence and testimony to
determine whether or not the order by the Bureau of Mines requiring George's Creek andBuffalo to discontinue all mining operations constituted a total taking or a partial taking
under the police powers of the State of Maryland. In other words, a further study of
the land was required to determine if there were any Other minerals or things of value
in the land which the State was not taking from George's Creek and Buffalo. If uponfurther evidence and testimony it was determined that the State was taking everything
owned by George's Creek and Buffalo, therefore constituting a total taking, the State
would be required to compensate George's Creek and Buffalo.
On the other hand, if something of value remained (e.g., fire clay, iron ore or
other minerals), the taking would not be a total taking and the State would not be re-quired to compensate the plaintiffs. Bureau of Mines v. George's Creek Coal & Land Co.,
272 Md. 143, -, 321 A.2d 748, 766-67 (1974).
7. The Supreme Court of the United States recognized a distinction in kind between
regulation under the police power and the exercise of eminent domain. In Mugler, v. Kan-
sas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), it was contended that the fourteenth amendment required just
compensation if regulation materially diminished the value of property. The Court said,
"It cannot be supposed that the States intended, by adopting that Amendment, to im-pose restraints upon the exercise of their powers for the protection of the safety, health,
or morals of the community." Id. at 664.
The Court continued:
"The exercise of the Police power by the destruction of property which is Itself apublic nuisance, or the prohibition of its use in a particular way, whereby its value be-
comes depreciated, Is very different from taking property for public use, or from depriving
a person of his property without due process of law. In the one case, a nuisance only Is
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compensation.8 Under the police power, property is not taken for
public use, but rather, the use- of property is regulated for the
public benefit and welfare.9 Thus, due process is afforded and no
compensation is required.' Yet, the police power is not unlimited.
The United States Supreme Court has said that although the pro-
tection against takings of private property for public use without
compensation is qual-ified by the proper exercise of the police power,
that qualification cannot be extended "until at last private property
disappears.""
The general rule is that while property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as
a taking.12 The extent to which such regulation can properly be
exercised is unclear, and has long provided a souce of difficulty. 3
Although there have been numerous attempts 14 to determine when
a regulation ends and a taking begins, courts have failed to formu-
late a concise theory capable of consistent application. 15 Thus, dif-
ficulties result when courts attempt to apply various "takings" con-
abated; In the other, unoffending property is taken away from an innocent owner." Id. at
669.
For a detailed survey of the power of eminent domain, see P. NIcHOLS, THE LAW
OF EMINENT DOMAIN (3d rev. ed. 1970) For a good discussion of state law concerning
eminent domain, see Guy, LAND CONDEMNATION: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF NORTH DAKOTA
STATUTORY LAW, N.D.L. REV. 387 (1974).
8. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution states that private property
shall not be taken for public use, without just compensation. U.S. Const. amend V.
This protection provided by the fifth amendment has been made applicable to the
states by its incorporation through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Chicago, B. & Q. FIR. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
See also, 1 P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 1.3, 4 (3d rev. ed. 1970).
9. See S. WEAVER, supra note 4, at § 329.
A great deal has been Written regarding the police powers of the states. "Much
of this writing encourages a belief that the police power is a malleable thing, capable of
being extended or molded into different shapes in response to the pressure of circum-
stances, so that one generation's power to regulated land uses may differ from that of
Its predecessors and its successors." Netherton, Implementation of Land Use Policy: Po-
lice Power v. Eminent Domain, 3 LAND AND WVATER L. REv. 33, 34 (1968). Justice Holmes
Would support such a view. In Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911), he
foresaw that "the police power extends to all great public needs." "Great public needs"
are defined as what is sanctioned by usage or held by the prevailing morality or strong
and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare.
Id. at 107.
10. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). The individual landowner who suffers a
loss is not entitled to compensation for prohibition of a use which conflicts with the
health, safety, morals, or general welfare of society. Id. at 658.
11. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). The Court concluded:
"We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public condi-
tion is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a short cut than the constitutional
way of paying for the change." Id. at 416.
12. Id. at 415.
13. Bureau of Mines v. George's Creek Coal & Land Co., 272 Md. 143,- , 321 A.2d
748, 765 (1974).
14. See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Founda-
tions of "Just Compensation ' Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967) ; Sax, Takings and the
Police Power, Eminent Domain, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
15. The uncertainty of an underlying doctrine has effectively been acknowledged by
the United States Supreme Court itself, which has stated that no rigid rules or set formu-
las are available to determine where regulation ends and taking begins. Goldblatt v,
Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962) ; United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149,
156 (1952).
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cepts to relatively new areas of the law such as environmental
regulations.1 6 This dilemma is important to North Dakota because
the state is on the threshhold of extensive future coal development,
and regulation of lands to be strip mined could play a significant
role.
The instant case discusses Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon
7
in length for two reasons. 8 First, Mahon sets out the basic pre-
mise on which further analysis is grounded.19 Second, it provides
the Court with a starting point in determining when there is a tak-
ing under police power regulation.' 0 Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking
for the Supreme Court in Mahon, is quoted as saying:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values
incident to property could not be diminished without paying
for every such change in the general law. As long recognized,
16. There are two recent environmental regulation cases which could prove to be of
landmark significance in the future. In Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d
761 (1972), the Supreme Court of Wisconsin ruled that governmental regulation restricting
the use of land to "indigenous and natural" uses. is not a taking which requires compen-
sation. Izaak Walton League v. St. Clair, 353 F. Supp. 698 (D. Minn. 1973), upheld the
authority of Congress to ban all mineral activities in a national forest wilderness area,
because in view of the public purpose of keeping the forest virginal and untrammeled, such
a regulation is reasonable, has a rational basis, and bears a substantial relation to a
public purpose.
In these two cases, the substantive merits of an environmental controversy were
decided in a definite manner, quite favorable to the use of police power for environmental
regulation. Yet, they were not unmindful of the warning in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 398 (1922): "We are In danger of forgetting that a strong public de-
sire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a
shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change." Id. at 416.
The court in Just, supra, in reference to that warning, stated:
This observation refers to the improvement of the public condition, the secur-
ing of a benefit not presently enjoyed and to which the public is not entitled.
The shoreland zoning ordinance preserves nature, the environment, and natural
resources as they were created and to which the people have a present right.
The ordinance does not create or improve the public condition but only pre-
serves nature from the clespoilage and harm resulting from the unrestricted
activities of humans.
Id. at - , 201 N.W.2d at 771.
17. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). There, the plaintiffs brought an action to enjoin the coal coin-
pany from mining under their residence in such a way as to cause a subsidence of its
surface. The company had conveyed the tract to the plaintiffs, , reserving the right to re-
move all the coal under that tract, and the grantees agreed to take the risk and waive
all claims for damage that might arise from the mining of the coal. The plaintiffs main-
tained that because a Pennsylvania statute subsequently enacted prohibited the mining ot
coal in any manner that would cause subsidence of any structure used for human habita-
tion, any public structure, public street or passage way, the coal company's right to mine
under their residence had been nullified. The Pennsylvana court held that the statute at
applied to the company's right to mine coal was a valid exercise of the police power.
The Supreme Court reversed that judgement, holding that the statute amounted to an
unconstitutional taking of the company's property without payment of compensation In
violation of the fourteenth amendment.
While the court emphasized the dimunition in value of property in their decision,
it may have turned on the fact that the party who bought and paid for only surface rights
would by statute be given benefit of the subterranean rights also.
18. Bureau of Mines v. George's Creek Coal & Land Co., 272 Md. 143, - , 321 A.2d
748, 758-59 (1974).
19. The basic premise, that police power regulation is not unlimited in that if It goes
too far It will constitute a taking, is presented in several cases. See, e.g., Goldblhtt v.
Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323
U.S. 373 (1945). See generally, 16 AM. Jur. 2d, Constitutioval Law § 301 (1964).
20. See discussion in note 31 infra.
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some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and
must yield to the police power. But obviously the implied li-
mitation must have its limits, or the contract and due pro-
cess clauses are gone.2 1
Thus, Bureau of Mines of Maryland sets out its first basic pre-
mise. After a regulation under the police power has been declared
otherwise constitutional, 2 2 it still must be determined whether it
constitutes a taking for which compensation must be paid. 2  In
other words, although regulation for the public welfare is a valid
exercise of the police power, the general rule is that such regula-
tion is limited. 24
The question left open, however, is how to determine whether
a regulation has gone beyond its limit and constitutes a taking.
Several tests have been applied by the United States Supreme Court
in previous cases. The oldest and most traditional test provides
that when governmental action constitutes a physical encroachment,
there is a compensable taking.2 5 The concept developed that a "tak-
ing" under the federal and state constitutions was found only if there
was a "taking altogether. ' '2 6 Thus taking meant appropriation and
dispossession of the owner, and compensation was limited accord-
ingly.27 A second test balances the burden of the individual against
21. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). This is opposed to some
opinions that suggest that the police power of the states should not be limited. in regard
to compensation, the only restraint being that the legislation must not be arbitrary nor
unreasonable. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) ; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S
623 (1887). These are cases where the use being prohibited was considered noxious. The
idea suggested is usually fostered in such cases.
A valid exercise of the police power generally does not require the state to com-
pensate the individual owner who sustains merely a pecuniary loss resulting from the
prohibition of a use which conflicts with the good of society. Comment, An Evaluaition o
the Rights and Remedies of a New York Landowner for Losses Due to Governmental Action-
With a Proposal for Return, 33 ALBaNY L. Ft v. 537, 546-51 (1969).
22. In order to be declarpd unconstitutional, the use of the police power by a state must
not be unreasonable or arbitrary, and it must have substantial relation to the objective of
the seizure. H. RoTTscAEFFR, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 82-88 (1939). See also, 1 P. Nf-
CHOLS, THE LAW or EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.42 (3d rev. ed. 1970).
23. Bureau of Mines v. George's Creek Coal & Land Co., 272 Md. 143, -, 321 A.2d
748, 760 (1974). See note 19 supra, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
24 Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, would support this position. There, a town ordi-
nance prohibited any excavation below the lvel of the water table, the result being that
the petitioner could no longer mine sand and gravel from his property. The petitioner
claimed that the ordinance was not a regulation of his business but rather a confiscation
in that it entirely prohibited him from conducting business on that property. The United
States Supreme Court rejected that view, but went on to say, "[t]his is not to say,
however, that governmental action in the form of regulation cannot be so onerous as to
constitute a taking which constitutionally requires compensation." Id. at 594.
25. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 166 (1871). Cf. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
26. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) ; Hyde v. Minn. D. & P. R.R. Co., 29
S.D. 220,1 36 N.W. 92 (1912).
27. One problem inherent in this theory is that It does not explain cases where com-
pensation for physical destruction is denied. E.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928)
(destruction of cedar trees to protect apple orchards from cedar rust) ; Lawton v. Steele,
152 U.S. 133 (1894) (destruction of fishnets, which could not lawfully be used). Neither
does it explain the distinction on the one hand where government affirmatively acquires
interest in the property, or on the other where the government by Its regulation requires
the landowners to forbear, such as a scenic easement in conjunction with some public pro.
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the benefits running to the public. 28  As long as the interest to
society outweighs the loss to the individual there is no taking. How-
ever, it is difficult to compare the values of benefits to the public
with the loss to a particular individual.
29
The court in the instant case turned to a third test in deter-
mining whether the prohibition of strip mining constituted a taking. 0
Under this approach, the magnitude of the property owner's loss
is the controlling factor.3 1 The court again quoted Mr. Justice
Holmes, in Mahon, where he said: "One fact for consideration in
determining such limits is the extent of the dimunition. When it
reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not all cases there must
be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the
act. 82
Since the primary concern in the present case was the dam-
age and degree of interference to the individual landowner, the
court examined a number of Maryland zoning cases to determine
Ject. City of St. Paul v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis and Omaha R.R. Co., 413 F.2d
762 (8th Cir. 1969). The physical encroachment requirement is seldom invoked today. a,
courts seem to realize that some regulatory actions can affect a compensable taking of
property without a physical invasion. Sax, supra note 14, at 46. See 2 P. NICHOLs, THE
LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.3 (3d rev. ed. 1970).
28. Michelman, supra note 14, at 1193-96, 1234-35. So long as the social gains resulting
from government encroachment on property rights "outweigh" the private detriment, no
compensation need be provided. With this approach, courts and juries become Involved in
making quantitative comparisons between essentially dissimilar factors of public interest
and private detriment. Whether reasonably accurate comparisons can be made is doubt-
ful. Without solid criterlia, balancing seems ethically indefensable and constitutionally
questionable. Id.
29. As for environmental regulations, how can unquantified environmental amenities and
values be given appropriate consideration? Cost-Benefit analysis has been given attention
as an applicable method of determining environmental value. Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis
and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 STAN. L. REv. 1092 (1972).. The
matter has received congressional attention by the United States Water Resources Coun-
cil, 36 Fed. Reg. 24144 (1971) ; 38 Fed. Reg. 24778 (1973). See also, United Statep Water
Resources Council, Procedures for Evaluation of Water and Related Land Resource Pro-
jects, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1971) ; Hearings on Administration of the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conser-
vation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 92 Cong., 2d Sess., ser.
92-25, pt. 2, at 35-180 (1972).
30. Bureau of Mines v. George's Creek Coal & Land Co., 272 Md. 143, - , 321 A.2d
748, 758 (1974).
31. Michelman, supra note 14, at 1190-93, 1229-34. While this test puts proper emphasis
on the extent of the property owner's loss, it is important to note the distinction between
regulations directed against "innocent" property uses, and non-trespassory devaluation,
brought about by public development, and regulations directed against uses considered
noxious or a nuisance. It appears that restrictions of noxious uses are given far more
leeway. E.g., Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) ; Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
Thus, it is important to remember that while a test such as dimunition in value
lends itself towards proper emphasis, it is only one of the many important considerations.
To rely solely on a particular test or definition of taking is to pick only one of the many
Important considerations. For example, in Y.M.C.A. v. United States, 395 U.S. 85 (1969),
the court's conclusion was based on broad concepts of fairness and justice. Mr. Justice
Brennan stated:
But where, as here, the private party is the particular intended beneficiary
of the governmental activity. 'fairness and justice' do not require that losses
which may result from that activity "be borne by the public as a whole,"
even though the activity may also be intended incidentally to benefit the
public.
Id. at 92.
32. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
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at which point the dimunition became a taking.33 One case relied
on extensively by the court provided important considerations to
determine whether a zoning restriction amounted to an unconstitu-
tional taking. 34 In that case the court said:
If the owner affirmatively demonstrates that the legislative
or administrative determination deprives him of all beneficial
use of the property, the action will be held unconstitutional.
But the restrictions imposed must be such that the property
cannot be used for any reasonable purpose. It is not enough
for the property owners to show that the zoning action results
in substantial loss or hardships. (emphasis added) 3
Borinsky emphasized the preeminence of economic value in deter-
mining whether all reasonable use has been taken, recognizing that
substantial dimunition in value is constitutionally permissible." As
the trial court in the instant case expressed in its opinion, the
regulation was a total taking requiring just compensation, because
strip mining was essential to realizing coal in the area, and other
minerals of value were practically non-existent. 7
But Borinsky set forth an additional requirement that must be
met to justify compensation. The burden is on the plaintiff to show
that the regulation deprives him of all reasonable use of the pro-
perty.3 8 To meet this burden, expert testimony must be substan-
tiated by fact. If it is not. general claims of economic infeasibility
are insufficient proof that there has been an unconstitutional tak-
ing. 39 The court in the instant case felt the legislature could con-
stitutionally conclude that the interest of the public generally
required the regulatory interference, and that the means chosen
were. reasonably necessary to accomplish the legislative purpose.4
But it did not feel it could determine, on the record before it,
whether Chapter 355 was confiscatory according to the principles
heretofore set forth. Thus, the case was remanded. 4
1
33. City of Baltimore v. Borinsky, 239 Md. 611, 212 A.2d 508 (1965) (discussed in note
33, supra) ; Stevens v. City of Salisbury, 240 Md. 556, 214 A.2d 775 (1965) where regula-
tion limited barriers along streets to a height of three feet; Potomac Sand, & Gravel v.
Governor of Maryland, 266 Md. 358, 293 A.2d 241 (1972), (where a statute made it un-
lawful to dredge for sand, gravel, or other aggregates of minerals in any of the tidal
waters or marshlands of a county in Maryland).
34. City of Baltimore v. Borinsky, 239 Md. 611, 212 A.2d 508 (1965). In that case the
Zoning Board denied the appellee's application to construct a warehouse on her property.
That property was situated in a residential zone and was improved by 43 garages of which
nine or ten were rented for storage of miscellaneous items from time to time. The appli-
cation was denied. Id.
35. Id. at - , 212 A.2d at 514.
36. Id.
37. George's Creek Coal & Land Co. v. Buckley, No. 6349 Equity (C. Md., filed Nov.
28, 1973).
38. City of Baltimore v. Borinsky, 239 Md. 611, - , 212 A.2d 508, 515 (1965).
39. Id.
40. Bureau of Mines v. George's Creek Coal & Land Co., 272 Md. 143, 321 A.2d 748,
765 (1973). Refer to note 4, supra.
41. Id. at -, 321 A.2d at 765.
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Bureau of Mines of Maryland has set out a step by step analy-
sis of factors that must be considered in cases alleging taking
without compensation. 42 The first consideration is whether the sta-
tute is a taking by eminent domain requiring compensation, or a
regulation of use under the State police powers.4 1 If the statute re-
gulates and thereby limits the use of property, it must be determined
whether the limitation is a valid exercise of the police power.
In view of the general rule that the regulation may be a taking
if it goes too far, three requirements must be met. First, the in-
terest of the general public as distinguished from that of a parti-
cular class must require the regulatory interference. Second, the
means chosen must be reasonably necessary for the accomplish-
ment of the purpose. And third, the means must not be unduly
oppressive to the individual. 44 To determine whether the means are
unduly oppressive, the burden is on the plaintiff to show that all
reasonable use has been taken, and that conclusion must be sup-
ported by substantial factual evidence. 45
It appears that North Dakota has not decided the question of
when police power regulation constitutes a taking. 6 When it does,
the basic considerations of the instant case should be reviewed
42. With this case, Maryland has made a positive contribution toward analyzing fac
tors that are essential to every case that deals' with takings under the police power. Un-
like other tests that have been developed and applied but have only met a limited number
of circumstances, this case outlines the basic and essential considerations. However, here
it was determined that the taking was total. Thus, a question remains a-s to whether at-
tacks on regulations will ever be upheld if the taking is only partial, even though under
the circumstances it may appear to force an individual to bear a loss which should be
borne by the community as a whole. Recent Supreme Court opinions have stated that the
just compensation or the taking clause was designed to bar the government from forcing
a single Individual to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole. E.g., Y.M.C.A. v. United States, 395 U.S. 85 (1969) ; Arm-
strong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
Thus, a "taking" is a broad concept based on principles of fairness and justice.
It was intended to protect the individual against government, and should not be used
unreasonably or construed narrowly. In Pearsall v. Board of Supervisors, 74 Mich. 558.
42 N.W. 77 (1889), the Michigan Supreme Court stated:
. . . the term 'taking' should not be used in an unreasonable or narrow
sense. It should not be limited to the absolute conversion of property, and
applied to land only; but it should include cases where the value is de-
stroyed by the action of the government, Or serious injury is inflicted to
the property itself, or exclusion of the owner from its enjoyment, or from
any of the appurtenances thereto.
Id. at -, 42 N.W. at 77-78.
The suggestion is that a taking in any situation occurs where the reallocation
and redistribution of value between the individual and government is unfair or unjust
under the circumstances. Of primary concern Is who should bear the loss under the cir-
cumstances.
43. Bureau of Mines v. George's Creek Coal & Land Co., 272 Md. 143, - , 321 A.2d
748, 756-57, 765 (1974).
44. Id. at - 321 A.2d at 765. The court in the instant case used the test articulated by
the United States Supreme Court in Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894), to determine
that the regulation was a valid exercise of the police power.
45. Bureau of Mines v. George's Creek Coal & Land Co., 272 Md. 143, - , 321 A.2d
748, 762-63 (1974).
46. The North Dakota cases are generally concerned with whether the regulation has
been a valid exercise of the police power, in terms of the objective sought and the reason-
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carefully. Whether the concept of "taking" will be construed in a
reasonable and broad sense, based on principles of fairness and
justice, is up to the courts. However, the need to conserve our
natural resources and preserve our natural beauty as part of the
health and welfare of our citizens is increasingly important. Thus,
it must be considered a significant factor when the issue of "taking"
arises. 47
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ableness of the regulation. Bob Rosen Water Conditioning Co. v. City of Bismarck, 181
N.W.2d 722 (N.D. 1970) ; Wilson v. City of Fargo, 141 N.W.2d 727 (N.D. 1965) ; State v.
Cromwell, 72 N.D. 565, 9 N.W.2d 914 (1943).
47. For a pertinent discussion of two recent environmental regulation cases placing
significant emphasis on the environment, refer to note 16, supra.
